




To the Editor: The severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) out-
break in Taiwan can be traced back to
a Taiwanese businessman who re-
turned from mainland China to Taiwan
in March 2003 (1). In May 2003, sev-
eral outer islands belonging to Taiwan
reported SARS, and on June 2, 2003,
Penghu Army Hospital reported a 40-
year-old man with suspected SARS.
The patient complained of shortness of
breath and a dry cough. He had visited
a person with confirmed SARS 7 days
earlier. He had a temperature of
38.4°C and leukocyte count of 7,920
cells/µL, and his chest x-ray showed
infiltration in both lower lobes.
Because medical facilities are lim-
ited on these islands, the Department
of Health authorized the National
Aeromedical Consultation Center
(NACC), a physician-based 24-hour
control center that coordinates all
aeromedical transport of critically ill
or injured patients within Taiwan, to
coordinate transporting these patients
to designated SARS hospitals in
Taipei. The NACC dispatched an air-
craft (Fokker 50) with a specialized
team of two flight physicians, one
flight paramedic, and a PIU (portable
isolation unit) on board. During the
flight, the medical crew prepared
equipment and dressed themselves in
three layers of personal protective
equipment. On arrival at Penghu, only
essential equipment was taken into
the hospital. One physician took the
PIU into the isolation room. The rest
of the crew and equipment remained
in the pre-isolation room. The patient
was briefed about the transport and
given 10 mg of metoclopramide to
prevent motion sickness. He was
asked to get into the PIU. A pulse
oximeter was attached to his finger
and placed inside the PIU so that it
could be read from the outside. Ather-
mohydrometer was also placed inside
the unit. The patient was given a
squeeze-bottle of water, and the unit
was sealed and inflated.
When leaving the pre-isolation
room, the physician and the PIU were
sprayed with a sodium hypochloride
solution before the first layer of per-
sonal protective equipment was
removed. At the exit, the entire med-
ical crew removed a layer of personal
protective equipment after being
sprayed with sodium hypochloride
solution. The team returned to the air-
port for the flight back to Taiwan. No
other personnel or family member
was allowed to accompany the patient
on the flight. 
The patient remained stable and
calm throughout the flight. His oxy-
gen saturation remained 97%–99%
with heart rate of 90 to 100 beats per
minute. Humidity was maintained at
60% and temperature at 28°C. On
arrival, the team proceeded to the iso-
lation ward. The physician accompa-
nied the patient into the isolation
room; the patient was released from
the PIU and transferred to the receiv-
ing medical team.
On exiting the isolation room, the
empty PIU and the medical team were
sprayed with sodium hypochloride.
All equipment was sprayed and put
into biohazard bags. The medical
team then discarded the last layer of
impermeable clothing. The PIU was
left in biohazard bags for 24 hours
before being sprayed with water and
air-dried.
After the assignment, the medical
crew self-documented their tempera-
ture twice daily for 10 days. All staff
remained asymptomatic with normal
body temperatures during this period.
The patient’s temperature remained
normal, and results of a polymerase
chain reaction of throat swab were
negative for SARS-associated coron-
avirus (SARS-CoV). He was dis-
charged on June 10, 2003.
When the SARS outbreak occurred
in Taiwan, many medical and ambu-
lance personnel were exposed to
SARS-CoV while transporting or car-
ing for patients with suspected SARS.
As SARS was an emerging infectious
disease, the mechanism of transmis-
sion was still unclear. Although one
report by Christopher and Eitzen (2)
suggested the value of an aeromedical
team to evacuate patients with sus-
pected lethal, infectious diseases, lim-
ited evidence supported a safer means
of transportation that would possibly
reduce transmission of SARS to per-
sons taking part in the mission.
When the SARS epidemic spread
to remote islands, aircraft companies
refused to transport patients with a
case of suspected SARS unless cer-
tain precautions were implemented.
Smaller aircraft used on domestic
routes in Taiwan do not meet the stan-
dards set for transporting SARS
patients (3,4), which prompted the
design of the PIU, an airtight
polyvinyl chloride bag with a one-
way inlet valve and an exhalation
valve. The valves were modified by
incorporating HEPA filters on both
sides of the valves and then connect-
ing a ventilator with an oxygen source
to the inlet valve. The respiratory rate
and tidal volume are set, depending
on weight and oxygen requirements
of the patient. By regulating the exha-
lation valve, the minimum pressure
inside the bag can be manipulated to
keep it from collapsing, since the bag
has no internal or external frame.
The PIU has some limitations. No
physical contact with the patient is
possible after the PIU is sealed and
inflated. Very strict criteria on the
suitability of a patient to be transport-
ed are followed. Any patient who is
unconscious, uncooperative, or whose
condition may deteriorate is not trans-
portable in this unit. Because of possi-
ble discomfort, a maximum total
transport time of 2 to 4 hours is sug-
gested. This time frame works well in
Taiwan; all locations in the country,
including the outer islands, are within
a 4-hour limit.
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The use of PIU during the SARS
crisis had a number of positive effects
in Taiwan. It enabled the safe trans-
port of SARS patients between hospi-
tals by air and road and decreased the
risk of cross-infecting transport per-
sonnel. The anxiety of transport per-
sonnel was decreased, as was the fear
felt by the population of the outer
islands. In addition, the credibility of
the local health authorities was
improved among the general popula-
tion in Taiwan.
Acknowledgments
We thank Charles van Reenen,
Philippe Barrault, Roger Farrow, Pascal
Rey Herme, and International SOS for
developing the PIU and their full support
during the transport of SARS patients in
Taiwan.
The study was supported by a grant
from the Department of Health, Taiwan
(DOH 135860) and a grant from National





Li-Hua Lu,# Yung-Chia Pai,# 
Mark Olsen,§ and Wen-Ta Chiu†‡
*National Aeromedical Consultation
Center, Taipei, Taiwan; †Taipei Medical
University, Taipei, Taiwan; ‡Wan Fang
Hospital, Taipei, Taiwan; §International
SOS, Taipei, Taiwan; ¶Chun Shan Hospital,
Taipei, Taiwan; and #Mackay Memorial
Hospital, Taipei, Taiwan
References
1. Center for Disease Control, Department of
Health, Taiwan. Prevention and control of
SARS in Taiwan (2nd edition). Sindian
(Taiwan): Yu Hwa; 2003.
2. Christopher GW, Eitzen EM. Air evacua-
tion under high-level biosafety contain-
ment: the aeromedical isolation team.
Emerg Infect Dis. 1999;5:241–6.
3. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. Interim guidance: air medical
transport for severe acute respiratory syn-
dromes (SARS) patients [monograph on the
Internet]. 2003 May 8 [cited 2003 Jun 28].
Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/nci-
dod/sars/airtransport-sarspatients.htm
4. Interim Domestic Infection Control
Precautions for aerosol-generating proce-
dures on patients with severe acute respira-
tory syndromes (SARS). Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention. 2003 May
20 [cited 2003 Jun 28]. Available from
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/aerosolin-
fectioncontrol.htm
Address for correspondence: Wen-Ta Chiu,
Institute of Injury Prevention and Control at
Taipei Medical University and Wan Fan
Hospital, 250 Wu-Shin Street, Taipei, Taiwan,
110; fax: 886-2-27390387; email: shtsai@
tmu.edu.tw
Psychosocial
Impact of SARS 
To the Editor: An outbreak of
severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) occurred from February to
May 2003 in Hong Kong, China,
Singapore, and Canada. According to
the World Health Organization, 1,755
people were infected in Hong Kong;
386 of these were healthcare workers.
A total of 300 persons died from
SARS, constituting a death rate of
17% (1).
Evidence suggests that persons
infected with SARS recovered physi-
cally, but SARS is associated with
social and psychological problems
poorly understood by the scientific
community. A survey in a convales-
cent hospital in Hong Kong showed
that approximately 50% of recovered
SARS patients showed anxiety (2),
and approximately 20% were fearful
(2). Approximately 20% of the reha-
bilitated patients showed some nega-
tive psychological effects (3), which
included insomnia and depression.
Some patients with serious cases
could not rid themselves of the mem-
ories of fighting SARS, and these
memories disrupted their daily activi-
ties. These psychosocial problems
may be due to the complications of
SARS medications, such as ribavirin
and corticosteroid. Persons who took
these drugs had hair loss, major mem-
ory loss, impaired concentration, and
depression. A medical practitioner in
Hong Kong who recovered from
SARS attempted suicide because
complications from drugs made him
unable to earn his living (4). 
In addition to SARS patients them-
selves, an estimated 50% of family
members of SARS patients had psy-
chological problems, including feel-
ings of depression or stigmatization
(5). They had difficulties sleeping,
and some children who had lost par-
ents cried continuously. Some chil-
dren also felt embarrassed to be a
member of a SARS family (6). The
spouse of one healthcare worker who
died from SARS attempted suicide at
her workplace (7). The loss of parents
who were SARS patients also
impaired the growth of their children
(7). A study conducted in China (8)
reported that negative SARS-related
information increased persons’ per-
ception of their risk and led to irra-
tional nervousness or fear.
Although data from systematic
studies of SARS do not exist, evidence
suggests that this disease has psy-
chosocial consequences for SARS
patients, their families, and society.
While biomedical scientists must con-
tinue their efforts to clarify the genetic
makeup of the SARS coronavirus,
look for new medications, and develop
vaccines (9–13), the social and psy-
chological aspects of SARS should not
be overlooked. Since nearly all
resources are devoted to biomedical
research and medical treatment, psy-
chosocial problems of SARS patients
and their families are largely ignored.
Our review of the literature using the
ISI Web of Knowledge on January 17,
2004, substantiated this observation.
To date, no systematic study examin-
ing psychosocial consequences of
SARS has been published in scientific
journals. A systematic exploration of
how SARS negatively affects patients’
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